From the influential evidence-based practice (EBP), to the increasingly persuasive evidence-informed practice (EIP), in the last decades, the field has sought to adequately allocate scientific evidence within social work’s practice. While this development suggests a move away from positivism, it is less clear towards where. Thus, this article advances classical pragmatism as a plausible philosophy of science for the treatment of evidence to account for this transition and the way forward. Pragmatism regards humans and their contexts as part of a continuity, constantly changing each other, always becoming. As such, it challenges what counts as ‘evidence’ and demands healthy awareness and criticism of preferences and biases, whether personal or contextual, in the self and in the subjects of interest. This opens up the door to plurality, to harness practical reason to solve practical problems, turning indeterminate situations into determinate ones, thereby generating warranted assertions.

从有影响力的循证实践（EBP）到越来越有说服力的循证实践（EIP），在过去的几十年中，该领域一直致力于在社会工作实践中充分分配科学证据。尽管这种发展表明已经摆脱了实证主义，但是向何处去尚不清楚。因此，本文提出将古典实用主义作为一种合理的科学哲学，用于处理证据以说明这种转变和前进的方向。实用主义将人及其背景视为连续性的一部分，不断变化，不断变化。因此，它挑战了所谓的“证据”，并要求健康地认识和批评对自我和所关注主题的偏好和偏见，无论是个人还是背景的偏好和偏见。这为多元打开了大门，