Once seen as the solution to the systemic risk of over-the-counter derivatives, central counterparties (CCPs) have become a source of concern for the financial stability of the European Union (EU). Distress of a single CCP might be transferred to clearing members and others CCPs, thereby endangering EU monetary and fiscal stability. However, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) has left fiscal responsibility as well as day-to-day supervision of EU-based CCPs (EU-CCPs) at the national level, albeit cross-border colleges of authorities can overturn key decisions of national supervisors. The Commission concluded that these supervisory arrangements needed to be reformed because they hamper the development of a single coherent EU approach to CCP supervision. Although the Commission had proposed to centralise EU-CCP supervision in the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the final 2019 CCP Supervision Regulation seeks to improve EMIR’s ineffective collegial framework by establishing an internal CCP Supervisory Committee within ESMA. Nevertheless, the continuing lack of loss mutualisation would keep on hindering the development of a single approach to EU-CCP supervision. Moreover, the new regulation adds another layer of complexity to the EMIR framework and clashes with the European monetary constitution. If an agreement on loss mutualisation was reached, EU-CCP supervision should be centralised in two EU bodies along objective lines: while the European Central Bank should be tasked with EU-CCP prudential supervision, ESMA should be responsible for EU-CCP conduct of business supervision. This framework would improve EU-CCP supervision and fit in with the current EU governance at once.

中央交易对手（CCP）一度被视为解决场外衍生品系统风险的解决方案，但已成为引起欧盟（EU）金融稳定的担忧之源。一个CCP的困境可能会转移到清算会员和其他CCP，从而危及欧盟的货币和财政稳定。但是，欧洲市场基础设施法规（EMIR）取消了国家一级对基于欧盟的CCP（EU-CCP）的财政责任和日常监管，尽管跨境的权威学院可以推翻国家主管。委员会的结论是，需要对这些监管安排进行改革，因为它们阻碍了欧盟对CCP监管采取单一一致方法的发展。尽管委员会已提议将EU-CCP监管集中在欧洲证券和市场管理局（ESMA）中，但最终的2019年CCP监管条例试图通过在ESMA内建立内部CCP监管委员会来改善EMIR无效的合议框架。然而，持续缺乏损失共存将继续阻碍欧盟-CCP监管单一方法的发展。此外，新法规给EMIR框架增加了另一层复杂性，并与欧洲货币宪法发生冲突。如果达成了关于损失共存的协议，则应按照客观方针将EU-CCP监管集中在两个欧盟机构中：欧洲中央银行应承担EU-CCP审慎监管的任务，而ESMA则应负责EU-CCP的业务开展监督。