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Who Is in Control? Practical Physical Layer Attack and Defense for mmWave-Based Sensing in Autonomous Vehicles
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security ( IF 6.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-28 , DOI: 10.1109/tifs.2021.3076287
Zhi Sun , Sarankumar Balakrishnan , Lu Su , Arupjyoti Bhuyan , Pu Wang , Chunming Qiao

With the wide bandwidths in millimeter wave (mmWave) frequency band that results in unprecedented accuracy, mmWave sensing has become vital for many applications, especially in autonomous vehicles (AVs). In addition, mmWave sensing has superior reliability compared to other sensing counterparts such as camera and LiDAR, which is essential for safety-critical driving. Therefore, it is critical to understand the security vulnerabilities and improve the security and reliability of mmWave sensing in AVs. To this end, we perform the end-to-end security analysis of a mmWave-based sensing system in AVs, by designing and implementing practical physical layer attack and defense strategies in a state-of-the-art mmWave testbed and an AV testbed in real-world settings. Various strategies are developed to take control of the victim AV by spoofing its mmWave sensing module, including adding fake obstacles at arbitrary locations and faking the locations of existing obstacles. Five real-world attack scenarios are constructed to spoof the victim AV and force it to make dangerous driving decisions leading to a fatal crash. Field experiments are conducted to study the impact of the various attack scenarios using a Lincoln MKZ-based AV testbed, which validate that the attacker can indeed assume control of the victim AV to compromise its security and safety. To defend the attacks, we design and implement a challenge-response authentication scheme and a RF fingerprinting scheme to reliably detect aforementioned spoofing attacks.

中文翻译:

谁在控制中?自主车辆中基于毫米波传感的实用物理层攻防

毫米波(mmWave)频段的宽带宽可带来前所未有的精度,毫米波感测对于许多应用已经变得至关重要,尤其是在自动驾驶汽车(AVs)中。此外,毫米波传感技术比其他传感技术(例如摄像机和LiDAR)具有更高的可靠性,这对于安全性至关重要的驾驶至关重要。因此,了解安全漏洞并提高AV中mmWave感应的安全性和可靠性至关重要。为此,我们通过在最新的mmWave测试平台和AV测试平台中设计和实施实际的物理层攻防策略,对AV中基于mmWave的传感系统进行端到端安全性分析在实际设置中。通过欺骗其mmWave感应模块,已开发出各种策略来控制受害AV,包括在任意位置添加伪造障碍物和伪造现有障碍物的位置。构建了五种真实世界的攻击场景,以欺骗受害者的AV,并迫使其做出危险的驾驶决策,从而导致致命的车祸。使用基于Lincoln MKZ的AV测试台进行了现场实验,研究了各种攻击场景的影响,该测试台验证了攻击者确实可以控制受害者AV,从而损害其安全性和安全性。为了防御攻击,我们设计并实现了挑战响应身份验证方案和RF指纹方案,以可靠地检测上述欺骗攻击。包括在任意位置添加伪造障碍物和伪造现有障碍物的位置。构建了五种真实世界的攻击场景,以欺骗受害者的AV,并迫使其做出危险的驾驶决策,从而导致致命的车祸。使用基于Lincoln MKZ的AV测试台进行了现场实验,研究了各种攻击场景的影响,该测试台验证了攻击者确实可以控制受害者AV,从而损害其安全性和安全性。为了防御攻击,我们设计并实现了挑战响应身份验证方案和RF指纹方案,以可靠地检测上述欺骗攻击。包括在任意位置添加伪造障碍物和伪造现有障碍物的位置。构建了五种真实世界的攻击场景,以欺骗受害者的AV,并迫使其做出危险的驾驶决策,从而导致致命的车祸。使用基于Lincoln MKZ的AV测试台进行了现场实验,研究了各种攻击场景的影响,该测试台验证了攻击者确实可以控制受害者AV,从而损害其安全性和安全性。为了防御攻击,我们设计并实现了挑战响应身份验证方案和RF指纹方案,以可靠地检测上述欺骗攻击。使用基于Lincoln MKZ的AV测试台进行了现场实验,研究了各种攻击场景的影响,该测试台验证了攻击者确实可以控制受害者AV,从而损害其安全性和安全性。为了防御攻击,我们设计并实现了挑战响应身份验证方案和RF指纹方案,以可靠地检测上述欺骗攻击。使用基于Lincoln MKZ的AV测试台进行了现场实验,研究了各种攻击场景的影响,该测试台验证了攻击者确实可以控制受害者AV,从而损害其安全性和安全性。为了防御攻击,我们设计并实现了挑战响应身份验证方案和RF指纹方案,以可靠地检测上述欺骗攻击。
更新日期:2021-05-25
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