Doxastic dualists acknowledge both outright beliefs and credences, and they maintain that neither state is reducible to the other. This gives rise to the ‘Bayesian Challenge’, which is to explain why we need beliefs if we have credences already. On a popular dualist response to the Bayesian Challenge, we need beliefs to simplify our reasoning. I argue that this response fails because credences perform this simplifying function at least as well as beliefs do.

中文翻译：

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信念并不能简化我们的推理，而可信度可以

Doxastic 二元论者承认完全的信念和信任，并且他们坚持认为这两种状态都不能还原为另一种状态。这就产生了“贝叶斯挑战”，这是为了解释如果我们已经有了信任，为什么我们还需要信念。在对贝叶斯挑战的流行二元论回应中，我们需要信念来简化我们的推理。我认为这种回应失败是因为信任至少和信念一样执行这种简化功能。