ABSTRACT

I estimate the extent to which modifications of privately securitized mortgages increased or forgave debt during the Great Recession and aftermath, from 2008 to 2014. I find that loan modifications weakened household balance sheets by adding $20 billion to household debt, with the net amount of debt added per modification doubling from 2010 to 2014. I also find that the increase in debt is consistent with capitalization of fees, but not missed interest payments. Capitalization of fees is significant because it has been associated with a principal-agent problem between investors and mortgage servicers preventing efficient loss mitigation, as well as consumer financial protection abuses.

摘要

我估计了从 2008 年到 2014 年大萧条期间和之后的私人证券化抵押贷款的修改增加或免除债务的程度。我发现贷款修改通过增加 200 亿美元的家庭债务削弱了家庭资产负债表，债务净额从 2010 年到 2014 年，每次修改增加一倍。我还发现债务的增加与费用资本化一致，但没有错过利息支付。费用资本化很重要，因为它与投资者和抵押贷款服务商之间的委托代理问题有关，阻碍了有效的损失缓解，以及消费者金融保护滥用。