We investigate the optimal response of unemployment insurance to economic shocks, both with and without commitment. The optimal policy with commitment follows a modified Baily-Chetty formula that accounts for job search responses to future UI benefit changes. As a result, the optimal policy with commitment tends to front-load UI, unlike the optimal discretionary policy. In response to shocks intended to mimic those that induced the COVID-19 recession, we find that a large and transitory increase in UI is optimal; and that a policy rule contingent on the change in unemployment, rather than its level, is a good approximation to the optimal policy.

我们调查了失业保险对经济冲击的最佳反应，无论有没有承诺。具有承诺的最优政策遵循修改后的 Baily-Chetty 公式，该公式说明求职对未来 UI 福利变化的反应。因此，与最佳自由裁量策略不同，具有承诺的最优策略倾向于前端加载 UI。为了应对旨在模仿那些引发 COVID-19 衰退的冲击，我们发现 UI 的大幅和暂时增加是最佳的；并且取决于失业率变化而不是其水平的政策规则是对最优政策的良好近似。