This article analyses the defaults of the League loans, which were private loans promoted by the League of Nations to support governments in central and eastern Europe in the 1920s. Previous works have argued that governments refused to grant these loans preferred status. However, this article shows that at the onset of the crisis, investors and governments treated these loans differently. It provides an empirical analysis to test whether there was a common element in the pricing of these loans and whether they enjoyed seniority compared to other, non-League loans. The findings show that there was a common factor driving the bond prices of these loans at the onset of the 1931 banking crisis. This article demonstrates that while these loans were not legally senior, certain governments granted the League loans de facto preferred status under the assumption that averting default would foster renewed support from the League. Archival evidence is provided to show that governments ceased to grant the League loans exceptional treatment when the expected support from the League did not materialize, which further weakened the ability of the League to secure emergency lending.

中文翻译：

---

争夺国际联盟的优先债权人地位，1931–3†

本文分析了国际联盟贷款的违约情况，这是国际联盟在 1920 年代为支持中欧和东欧政府而推动的私人贷款。以前的研究认为，政府拒绝授予这些贷款的优先地位。然而，本文表明，在危机开始时，投资者和政府以不同的方式对待这些贷款。它提供了实证分析，以测试这些贷款的定价是否存在共同因素，以及与其他非联盟贷款相比，它们是否享有资历。研究结果表明，在 1931 年银行业危机爆发时，有一个共同因素推动了这些贷款的债券价格。本文表明，虽然这些贷款在法律上并不具有优先权，但某些政府事实上已授予联盟贷款假定避免违约将促进联盟的新支持。提供的档案证据表明，当联盟的预期支持没有实现时，政府停止给予联盟贷款特殊待遇，这进一步削弱了联盟获得紧急贷款的能力。