We adopt the epistemic framework of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) to model the distinction between a player's behavior at each node, which is part of the external state, and his plan, which is described by his beliefs about his own behavior. This allows us to distinguish between intentional and unintentional behavior, and to explicitly model how players revise their beliefs about the intentions of others upon observing their actions. Rational players plan optimally and their behavior is consistent with their plans. We illustrate our approach with detailed examples and some results. We prove that optimal planning, belief in continuation consistency and common full belief in both imply the backward induction strategies and beliefs in games with perfect information and no relevant ties. More generally, we present within our framework relevant epistemic assumptions about backward and forward-induction reasoning, and relate them to similar ones studied in the previous literature.

我们采用Battigalli和Siniscalchi（1999）的认识论框架来模拟玩家在每个节点（属于外部状态的一部分）处的行为与他的计划之间的区别，后者由对自己行为的信念来描述。这使我们能够区分有意行为和无意行为，并明确地模拟玩家在观察自己的行为时如何修正对他人意图的信念。理性参与者的计划是最优的，他们的行为与计划是一致的。我们通过详细的示例和一些结果来说明我们的方法。我们证明，最佳计划，对连续性的信念以及对共同的完全信念都暗示着向后归纳策略和对具有完美信息且没有相关联系的游戏的信念。更普遍，