By analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).

通过分析相互联系的交叉所有制，这项工作重新考虑了为出口商设定补贴的激进政府的效率低下（Brander和Spencer，国际经济杂志18：83-100）。利用第三市场古诺（Cournot）双头垄断模型，我们表明，在商品差异化（补充）时，以税收（补贴）形式实施的战略贸易政策在企业交叉的精确范围内优于帕累托（Pareto）优于自由贸易。所有权，很大程度上取决于产品竞争的程度。这些结果挑战了传统的结果，即当产品作为替代品（补充品）时，公共干预（1）始终是补贴的提供，（2）总是导致帕累托劣质（分别是帕累托优等）。