ABSTRACT

Most teachers have tenure protections that constrain dismissal. Some argue that tenure improves recruitment and retention by mitigating the risk of monopsony employment and substituting job security for lower salaries. Others argue that tenure reduces performance incentives making it difficult to dismiss ineffective teachers. We examine supply-side responses of teachers after the elimination of tenure before administrators could use performance to dismiss teachers. Voluntary teacher attrition increased after tenure elimination with effects concentrated in groups that are theoretically most likely to value job protections. Specifically, tenure removal increased exit of teachers with bottom decile value-added measures and retirement eligible teachers.

摘要

大多数教师都有限制解雇的任期保护。一些人认为，任期通过降低垄断就业的风险和用工作保障来代替较低的工资来改善招聘和保留。其他人则认为，终身制会降低绩效激励，因此很难解雇效率低下的教师。我们在行政人员可以使用绩效解雇教师之前检查取消任期后教师的供给方反应。取消终身教职后，自愿教师流失增加，其影响集中在理论上最可能重视工作保护的群体中。具体而言，任期取消增加了具有最低十分位增值措施的教师和符合退休条件的教师的退出。