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Postphenomenology, the Empirical Turn and “Transcendentality”
Foundations of Science ( IF 0.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-22 , DOI: 10.1007/s10699-020-09741-6
Don Ihde

Ever since Achterhuis designated American philosophy of technology “empirical” there has been a Continental “push-back” defending the first generation of European—mostly Heidegger’s essentialistic “transcendental”—philosophy of technology. While I prefer a “concrete” turn—to avoid confusing with British “empiricism”—in a belief that particular technologies are different from others—this is a quibble. I admit I was very taken by Richard Rorty’s “anti-essentialism” and “non-foundationalism” in his version of pragmatism, and have adapted much of that stance into postphenomenology. In this contribution I reply to the comments of Lars Botin and Robert Rosenberger.



中文翻译:

后现象学,经验转向和“超验性”

自阿奇特胡斯(Achterhuis)将美国技术哲学指定为“经验主义”以来,就出现了一种大陆“后推式”技术,捍卫了第一代欧洲人-主要是海德格尔的本质主义“先验”技术哲学。为了避免与英国的“经验主义”混为一谈,尽管我更喜欢“具体”的转变,但我认为特定的技术与其他技术不同,但这是一种怪癖。我承认理查德·罗蒂(Richard Rorty)对实用主义的看法非常欣赏他的“反本质主义”和“非基础主义”,并已将这种立场大部分用于后现象学。在本文中,我回复了拉斯·博丁和罗伯特·罗森伯格的评论。

更新日期:2021-05-22
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