Capital and taxes play vital roles in transnational supply chain financing and operations. We use the Stackelberg game method to explore the financing strategy selection and contract clauses setting for a capital-constrained transnational supply chain with vertical equity holding. The results prove that asset structure, tax difference, and shareholding ratio are essential in selecting the financing strategy and additional clause. First, a higher supplier's asset structure can increase the profits of supply chain members. Second, a threshold for contract choice connected to tax difference is discovered. Early payment with a discount clause is optimal when tax difference is significant. When the tax difference is slight, buyer financing without additional clauses is optimal. Further, there exists an optimal shareholding ratio related to tax, which can avoid double marginalisation under buyer financing and reduce supply chain losses under bank financing. Tax subsidies due to deficit make supply chain performance outstrip centralised decision-making when the shareholding ratio is more excellent than a threshold. Last, the choice of strategy under buyer financing is related to the ex-ante or ex-post signing of the purchase contract and the limited deduction of interest payment within the tax law. Our findings guide transnational supply chain financing and operations.

资本和税收在跨国供应链融资和运营中发挥着至关重要的作用。我们采用Stackelberg博弈方法探讨了垂直股权控股的资本受限跨国供应链的融资策略选择和合同条款设置。结果证明，资产结构、税收差异和持股比例是选择融资策略和附加条款的关键。首先，较高的供应商资产结构可以增加供应链成员的利润。其次，发现了与税收差异相关的合同选择门槛。当税收差异很大时，最好使用折扣条款提前付款。当税收差异很小时，没有附加条款的买方融资是最佳的。此外，存在与税收相关的最佳持股比例，可以避免买方融资下的双重边缘化，减少银行融资下的供应链损失。当持股比例超过阈值时，由于赤字导致的税收补贴使供应链绩效超过集中决策。最后，买方融资下的策略选择与购买合同的事前或事后签订以及税法规定的利息支付的有限扣除有关。我们的研究结果指导跨国供应链融资和运营。买方融资下的策略选择与购买合同的事前或事后签订以及税法规定的利息支付的有限扣除有关。我们的研究结果指导跨国供应链融资和运营。买方融资下的策略选择与购买合同的事前或事后签订以及税法规定的利息支付的有限扣除有关。我们的研究结果指导跨国供应链融资和运营。