This paper studies the optimal design of sales mechanisms when a buyer can quit a negotiation for an outside option at any time. The main results show that the profit-maximizing mechanism induces a set of buyer types to delay purchasing a good if the value of the outside option is highly dispersed among buyer types. Moreover, to prevent a buyer from quitting a negotiation, the profit-maximizing mechanism also features an upfront payment, which is compensated later by a price discount. The seller can implement the profit-maximizing mechanism by offering a declining price path or a menu of European options.

中文翻译：

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具有外部选择权的最优销售机制

当买方可以随时退出外部选择权的谈判时，本文研究了销售机制的最佳设计。主要结果表明，如果外部期权的价值在购买者类型之间高度分散，则利润最大化机制会导致一组购买者类型延迟购买商品。此外，为防止买方退出谈判，利润最大化机制还具有预付款项，该款项以后会通过价格折扣得到补偿。卖方可以通过提供下降的价格路径或欧洲期权菜单来实现利润最大化机制。