ABSTRACT

This paper explores the relation between metaethical reflection and value experience, and does so by focusing on robust realism. Robust realism is typically criticized for its ontological and epistemological commitments. In this paper, however, we hope to shed new critical light on the plausibility of the theory by using two concepts – ‘reification’ and ‘alienation’ – that have their origin in critical social theory. We use the concept of ‘reification’ as an interpretative lens to look at robust realism and show that it is reifying in two respects: it turns values into things, and, correspondingly, turns human agents into disengaged observers of those things. This analysis is then used to argue that robust realism is alienating in the sense that it distances us from the world that presents itself to us in value experience, and that it separates us from what we call our engaged responsiveness. We also argue that its alienating effects give us good reason to reject the theory.

摘要

本文探讨了元伦理反思与价值体验之间的关系，并通过关注稳健的现实主义来做到这一点。鲁棒实在论通常因其本体论和认识论的承诺而受到批评。然而，在本文中，我们希望通过使用源自批判社会理论的两个概念——“物化”和“异化”——来阐明该理论的合理性。我们使用“物化”的概念作为解释性镜头来看待稳健的现实主义，并表明它在两个方面进行了物化：它将价值转化为事物，相应地，将人类代理人变成这些事物的独立观察者。然后，这种分析被用来论证稳健现实主义正在疏远，因为它使我们与在价值经验中呈现给我们的世界保持距离，并且它将我们与我们所谓的积极响应分开。我们还认为，它的异化效应给了我们拒绝该理论的充分理由。