I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives the intuitively correct results. I conclude by considering how it can be used to defend two controversial modal arguments, a Cartesian argument for dualism and an ontological argument for the existence of God.

中文翻译：

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模态外观的辩护

我认为，关于看似可能的事情的信念与关于看似实际的事情的信念大致相同的方式被证明是正当的。我这样做是通过对与现象保守主义相关的认知原则进行奇泽化，然后模态化。该原理针对许多示例进行了测试，并给出了直观正确的结果。我最后考虑如何使用它来为两个有争议的模态论证辩护，一个是笛卡尔二元论论证，另一个是关于上帝存在的本体论论证。