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The Impact of Competition on Investment: Evidence From California Hospitals*
The Journal of Industrial Economics ( IF 1.054 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-17 , DOI: 10.1111/joie.12243
Nathan E. Wilson 1
Affiliation  

I examine the relationship between bargaining leverage and capital investment using data on California’s hospital markets. I find evidence that investment increases with bargaining leverage; a hospital whose bargaining position improves by one standard deviation will increase its investment rate by 16 percentage points. A positive causal relationship between bargaining leverage and investment fits the institutional details of the health care sector, where many firms have non‐profit tax status, making it difficult to return monopoly rents to shareholders. Consistent with this explanation, I find that non‐profit hospitals with bargaining leverage invest more than for‐profit ones, all else equal. I do not find strong evidence that financing constraints matter disproportionately for hospitals operating in more competitive markets, supporting the hypothesis that the incremental investment may not be socially efficient.

中文翻译:

竞争对投资的影响:来自加利福尼亚医院的证据*

我使用加利福尼亚州医院市场的数据研究了议价能力与资本投资之间的关系。我发现有证据表明,随着议价能力的提高,投资会增加。讨价还价能力提高一个标准差的医院将使投资率提高16个百分点。讨价还价杠杆与投资之间的正因果关系符合医疗保健部门的机构细节,在该部门,许多公司都具有非营利性税收身份,这使得将垄断租金返还给股东变得困难。根据这一解释,我发现具有议价能力的非营利性医院的投资要比营利性医院更多,其他所有条件都是平等的。我找不到有力的证据表明,融资约束对竞争更激烈的市场中运营的医院的影响不成比例,
更新日期:2021-05-17
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