We explore input cost pass‐through in multi‐unit procurement auctions. Whether cost shocks are private versus common across firms has important implications for discriminatory, but not uniform price auctions. We provide evidence of asymmetric pass‐through of private cost shocks in discriminatory auctions. Unlike uniform price auctions, revenue‐maximizing bidders in discriminatory auctions ‘pad’ bids close to the expected clearing price for units with costs below that price, but they do not bid below cost on higher cost units. Therefore, if costs are higher than expected, the clearing price rises and if costs are lower than expected, the clearing price remains high.

中文翻译：

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多单元采购拍卖中的不对称成本传递：一种实验方法*

我们探索多单位采购拍卖中的输入成本传递。成本冲击是私人的还是公司间的共同冲击，对歧视性（而不是统一的价格拍卖）具有重要意义。我们提供了歧视性拍卖中私人成本冲击的不对称传递的证据。与统一价格拍卖不同，在歧视性拍卖中，收益最大化的竞标者将“低于”价格低于成本价单位的期望清算价的“垫”价，但对于较高成本价位的单位，其出价不低于成本价。因此，如果成本高于预期，则结算价格会上涨；如果成本低于预期，则结算价格仍会很高。