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An upper bound for the $$\ell _1$$ ℓ 1 -variation along the road to agreement
International Journal of Game Theory ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00781-1
Dimitry Shaiderman

Two agents with a common prior on the possible states of the world participate in a process of information transmission, consisting of sharing posterior probabilities of an event of interest. Aumann’s Agreement Theorem implies that such a process must end with both agents having the same posterior probability. We show that the \(\ell _1\)-variation of the sequence of posteriors of each agent, obtained along this process, must be finite, and provide an upper bound for its value.



中文翻译:

$$ \ ell _1 $$ℓ1-沿达成协议之路的变化的上限

在世界的可能状态上具有共同先验的两个主体参与信息传输过程,该过程由共享感兴趣事件的后验概率组成。Aumann的协议定理表明,这样的过程必须以具有相同后验概率的两个代理结束。我们表明,在此过程中获得的每个代理的后代顺序的\(\ ell _1 \)-变数必须是有限的,并为其值提供一个上限。

更新日期:2021-05-17
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