This paper studies payoffs in subgame perfect equilibria of two-player discounted overlapping generations games with perfect monitoring. Assuming that mixed strategies are observable and a public randomization device is available, it is shown that sufficiently patient players can obtain any payoffs in the interior of the smallest rectangle containing the feasible and strictly individually rational payoffs of the stage game, when we first choose the rate of discount and then choose the players’ lifespan. Unlike repeated games without overlapping generations, obtaining payoffs outside the feasible set of the stage game does not require unequal discounting.

中文翻译：

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两人打折的OLG游戏的均衡收益

本文研究了具有完美监控的两人折扣重叠代游戏的子游戏完美平衡的收益。假设可以观察到混合策略并且可以使用公共随机设备，则表明当我们首先选择阶段游戏时，足够耐心的玩家可以在最小的矩形内部获得任何收益，其中最小的矩形包含阶段游戏的可行且严格个人合理的收益。折扣率，然后选择玩家的寿命。与没有重叠世代的重复游戏不同，在阶段游戏的可行集合之外获得收益不需要不均等的折扣。