The problem of Kant's first Critique is the problem of pure reason: how are synthetic judgments possible a priori? Many of his readers have believed that the problem depends upon a delimitation within the class of a priori truths of a class of irreducibly synthetic truths—a delimitation whose possibility is doubtful—because absent this it is not excluded that all a priori truths are analytic. I argue, on the contrary, that the problem depends on nothing more than the human knower's everyday consciousness of her own finitude: her dependence in thinking and knowing on what is given to her. The problem is a difficulty about how the concepts which figure in metaphysical judgments could represent reality given that they cannot do so in the way in which concepts figuring in empirical judgments do. Empirical judgment here functions as exemplary of thought and knowledge because it is exemplary of finite thought and knowledge. Mere analysis could not, therefore, dissolve the problem even in principle, because to say that a concept can be analyzed is not yet to explain the possibility of its real representative power. The significance of the analytic-synthetic distinction in the context of the problem of pure reason is that its formulation allows Kant to say this.

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纯粹理性的真正问题

康德第一个批判的问题是纯粹理性的问题：综合判断如何先天地可能？他的许多读者都相信，问题取决于在先验真理类别内对不可还原的综合真理类别的界定——这种界定的可能性是值得怀疑的——因为没有这一点，并不排除所有先验的真理是分析的。相反，我认为问题仅取决于人类认识者对自身有限性的日常意识：她在思考和认识方面依赖于给予她的东西。问题在于形而上学判断中的概念如何代表现实，因为它们不能像经验判断中的概念那样表现。经验判断在这里起到了思想和知识的示范作用，因为它是有限思想和知识的典范。因此，即使在原则上，单纯的分析也不能解决问题，因为说一个概念可以被分析，还不能解释它真正代表力量的可能性。