Foreign-aid projects typically have local effects, so they need to be placed close to the poor if they are to reduce poverty. I show that, conditional on local population levels, World Bank (WB) project aid targets richer parts of countries. This relationship holds over time and across world regions. I test five donor-side explanations for pro-rich targeting using a pre-registered conjoint experiment on WB Task Team Leaders (TTLs). TTLs perceive aid-receiving governments as most interested in targeting aid politically and controlling implementation. They also believe that aid works better in poorer or more remote areas, but that implementation in these areas is uniquely difficult. These results speak to debates in distributive politics, international bargaining over aid, and principal-agent issues in international organizations. The results also suggest that tweaks to WB incentive structures to make ease of project implementation less important may encourage aid to flow to poorer parts of countries.

中文翻译：

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为什么援助不针对最贫困的人？

援外项目通常具有当地效应，因此如果要减少贫困，就需要将它们放在靠近穷人的地方。我表明，根据当地人口水平，世界银行 (WB) 项目援助针对的是国家较富裕的地区。这种关系随着时间的推移和世界各地的变化而存在。我使用预先注册的 WB Task Team Leaders (TTLs) 联合实验测试了五种捐助方对支持富人目标的解释。TTL 认为受援国政府最有兴趣在政治上瞄准援助并控制实施。他们还认为，援助在更贫困或更偏远的地区效果更好，但在这些地区实施起来特别困难。这些结果说明了分配政治、国际援助谈判和国际组织中的委托代理问题的辩论。