In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In equilibrium, players internalize the need for consensus in forming friendships and choose their optimal strategies on subsets of k players—a form of bounded rationality. The k‐player consensual dynamic delivers a probabilistic ranking of a game's equilibria, and via a varying k, facilitates estimation of such games.

中文翻译：

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（不稳定）网络上的纳什均衡

作为对变化的响应，个人可以选择关注其朋友的响应，或者选择更改其朋友。要为这些决策建模，请考虑一个游戏，玩家在游戏中选择自己的行为和友情。在均衡状态下，参与者将形成友谊的共识需求内在化，并在k个参与者的子集上选择最优策略，这是有限理性的一种形式。该ķ单放机自愿动态提供了一个概率的排名游戏的平衡点，并通过变ķ，促进了此类游戏的估计。