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Screening in Vertical Oligopolies
Econometrica ( IF 6.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-13 , DOI: 10.3982/ecta17016
Hector Chade 1 , Jeroen Swinkels 2
Affiliation  

A finite number of vertically differentiated firms simultaneously compete for and screen agents with private information about their payoffs. In equilibrium, higher firms serve higher types. Each firm distorts the allocation downward from the efficient level on types below a threshold, but upward above. While payoffs in this game are neither quasi‐concave nor continuous, if firms are sufficiently differentiated, then any strategy profile that satisfies a simple set of necessary conditions is a pure‐stategy equilibrium, and an equilibrium exists. A mixed‐strategy equilibrium exists even when firms are less differentiated. The welfare effects of private information are drastically different than under monopoly. The equilibrium approaches the competitive limit quickly as entry costs grow small. We solve the problem of a multi‐plant firm facing a type‐dependent outside option and use this to study the effect of mergers.

中文翻译:

垂直寡头筛查

有限数量的垂直分化的公司同时竞争和筛选代理人有关其收益的私人信息。在均衡中,较高的公司服务于较高的类型。每个公司在低于阈值的类型上将分配从效率级别向下扭曲,而在高于阈值的类型上扭曲。尽管此博弈中的收益既不是准凹的也不是连续的,但是如果公司具有足够的差异性,那么满足简单的必要条件集的任何策略配置文件都是纯策略均衡,并且存在均衡。即使企业之间的差异较小,也存在混合策略均衡。私人信息的福利影响与垄断下的福利影响大不相同。随着进入成本的增加,均衡迅速接近竞争极限。
更新日期:2021-05-14
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