This paper targets a nearly universal assumption in the philosophical literature: that prepunishment is unproblematic for consequentialists. Prepunishment threats do not deter, as deterrence is traditionally conceived. In fact, a pure prepunishment legal system would tend to increase the criminal disposition of the grudgingly compliant. This is a serious problem since, from many perspectives, but especially from a consequentialist one, a primary purpose of punishment is deterrence. I analyze the decision theory behind pre- and postpunishments, which helps clarify both what deterrence is and how it operates in consequentialist justifications of punishment. I end by sketching a road map for the future of prepunishment as artificial intelligence and other technological advances generate increasing possibilities for its use.

中文翻译：

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预惩罚的结果主义问题

本文针对哲学文献中一个几乎普遍的假设：预惩罚对结果论者来说没有问题。惩罚前的威胁并不能起到威慑作用，因为威慑是传统意义上的。事实上，纯粹的刑前法律制度往往会增加对勉强服从者的刑事处置。这是一个严重的问题，因为从许多角度来看，尤其是从后果主义的角度来看，惩罚的主要目的是威慑。我分析了惩罚前后背后的决策理论，这有助于阐明威慑是什么以及威慑如何在后果主义的惩罚辩护中发挥作用。随着人工智能和其他技术进步为其使用带来越来越多的可能性，我最后勾画了惩罚前未来的路线图。