Abstract:

This article analyzes the states of Iran and Egypt before the eruption of revolutionary processes in those countries in 1979 and 2011 respectively. Its aim is to delineate the different roles of the armies as the last lethal and organized bastions of dictatorships during those revolutions. In Egypt, the army successfully protected the Egyptian state from a complete downfall, while in Iran, the army became completely disorganized and shattered. It argues that the extreme personal rule of Iran’s shah [king] within a neo-sultanic framework and his extreme depoliticization of the army rendered it unable to act independently during a revolutionary process. In contrast, the distribution of power between the army and presidential palace within an institutionalized dual military state enabled the army to play a much more definitive role during the revolutionary process in Egypt. Consequently, unlike in 1979 Iran, the army in 2011 Egypt not only saved the pre-revolutionary military dictatorship but restored it in a much more brutal way.

摘要：

本文分析了伊朗和埃及分别于 1979 年和 2011 年爆发革命进程之前的国家。其目的是描绘军队在这些革命中作为独裁政权最后的致命和有组织的堡垒的不同作用。在埃及，军队成功地保护了埃及国家免于彻底垮台，而在伊朗，军队变得完全混乱和支离破碎。它认为，伊朗国王在新苏丹框架内的极端个人统治和他对军队的极端非政治化使其无法在革命过程中独立行动。相比之下，在制度化的双重军事国家内，军队和总统府之间的权力分配使军队能够在埃及的革命进程中发挥更加决定性的作用。因此，与 1979 年的伊朗不同，2011 年的埃及军队不仅挽救了革命前的军事独裁统治，而且以更加残酷的方式恢复了它。