Abstract

Between 2009 and 2011, there was an intense debate in UK, Canadian, and Australian military intelligence circles regarding two putatively competing doctrinal concepts, the U.S.-originated “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” and the United Kingdom’s “intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.” The inclusion, or not, of target acquisition proved a flashpoint for a wider and deeper range of existing concerns about the organizational and doctrinal relationships between intelligence and operations in a military command staff. These, in turn, reflected a more fundamental and ongoing transformation in that relationship arising from “revolution in military affairs” during the 1990s. The article traces the debate up to its premature termination by fiat in 2011 and concludes that these issues remain to be properly addressed in UK and allied intelligence doctrine.

摘要

2009 年至 2011 年间，英国、加拿大和澳大利亚的军事情报界就两个假定相互竞争的学说概念展开了激烈辩论，即源自美国的“情报、监视和侦察”和英国的“情报、监视、目标获取”和侦察。” 包括或不包括目标获取证明了对军事指挥人员中情报与行动之间的组织和条令关系的更广泛和更深层次的现有担忧的爆发点。这些反过来又反映了 1990 年代“军事革命”引起的这种关系的更根本和持续的转变。