During a cultural festival, artists and theaters act as a cartel by agreeing on pricing decisions that maximize the groups’ profit as a whole. We model the problem of sharing the profit created by a festival among organizing theaters as a cooperative game. In such a game, the worth of a coalition is defined as the theaters’ profit from the optimal fixation of prices. We show that this class of games is convex and we axiomatically characterize the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) for this class of games. We also provide an axiomatic basis for the downstream incremental solution. Finally, we apply this model to the NEXT festival, for which we have collected data. We propose an approach to derive the games’ vector from the data and we compute the different solutions.

在文化节期间，艺术家和剧院通过商定价格决策来最大程度地发挥集团整体利益，从而成为卡特尔。我们对在将剧院作为合作游戏组织剧院之间分享节日创造的利润的问题进行建模。在这样的游戏中，联盟的价值被定义为剧院从最佳定价中获得的利润。我们证明这类游戏是凸的，并且根据公理来表征此类游戏的Shapley值（Shapley 1953）。我们还为下游增量解决方案提供了公理基础。最后，我们将此模型应用于已收集数据的NEXT音乐节。我们提出了一种从数据中得出游戏向量的方法，并计算了不同的解决方案。