The incentives available to enterprises located in special economic zones can be classified into three broad categories, namely, (i) fiscal incentives in the nature of tax incentives and exemption of duties, (ii) non-fiscal incentives in the form of infrastructural and developmental facilities, and (iii) regulatory incentives covering lenient and flexible compliance requirements. The fiscal incentives in special economic zones are, to an extent, regulated by the law of the World Trade Organization although direct challenges of special economic zone policies have been very few or non-existent. The absence of legal challenges led to a number of World Trade Organization members pursuing unilateral trade policies within their special economic zones. However, the recent World Trade Organization Panel findings in India—Export Related Measures appear to highlight the thin margin for trade unilateralism especially in relation to fiscal incentives in special economic zones. In the above context, this article examines the permissible limits of trade unilateralism, in the context of special economic zones, by providing a fresh understanding of the disciplines under international trade law and the available jurisprudence. It focuses, in particular, on the precise contours of permissible trade unilateralism exercised by World Trade Organization members when granting fiscal incentives. In doing so, this article also examines the concept of exception as a manifestation of unilateralism in International Economic Law.

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WTO 诉讼和经济特区：确定特殊贸易单边主义的范围

位于经济特区的企业可获得的激励措施可分为三大类，即（i）税收优惠和免税性质的财政激励措施，（ii）基础设施和发展形式的非财政激励措施设施，以及 (iii) 涵盖宽松和灵活合规要求的监管激励措施。尽管经济特区政策的直接挑战很少或不存在，但经济特区的财政激励措施在一定程度上受世界贸易组织法律的约束。没有法律挑战导致一些世界贸易组织成员在其经济特区内推行单边贸易政策。然而，世界贸易组织小组最近在印度的调查结果——出口相关措施似乎突显了贸易单边主义的微弱优势，特别是在经济特区的财政激励措施方面。在上述背景下，本文通过对国际贸易法和现有判例的新认识，检验了经济特区背景下贸易单边主义的允许限度。它特别关注世界贸易组织成员在给予财政激励时所允许的贸易单边主义的精确轮廓。在此过程中，本文还考察了作为国际经济法中单边主义表现形式的例外概念。