ABSTRACT

Duties to oneself are allegedly incoherent: if we had duties to ourselves, we would be able to opt out of them. I argue that there is a constraint on one’s ability to release oneself from duties to oneself. The release must be autonomous in order to be normatively transformative. First, I show that the view that combines the division of the self with the second-personal characterization of morality is problematic. Second, I advance a fundamental solution to the problem of the incoherence of duties to oneself, one that does not rely on any division of the self, temporal or otherwise. I build upon the prevalent idea that, in releasing others from duties, we exercise the power of consent. The transformative force of consent partly derives from our autonomy. Invoking a plausible characterization of autonomy, I argue that release from duties requires the right kind of mental state.

摘要

据称，对自己的责任是不连贯的：如果我们对自己负有责任，我们将能够选择退出。我认为，一个人将自己从职责中解脱出来的能力受到限制。发布必须是自主的，以便在规范上具有变革性。首先，我表明将自我的划分与道德的第二人称表征相结合的观点是有问题的。其次，我提出了一个根本解决方案，以解决对自己的职责不一致的问题，它不依赖于任何时间或其他方面的自我划分。我建立在一个普遍的观点之上，即在释放他人的职责时，我们行使了同意的权力。同意的变革力量部分源于我们的自主权。援引对自治的合理描述，