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Retributivism and the (Lack of) Justification of Proportionality
Criminal Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-05-11 , DOI: 10.1007/s11572-021-09579-4
Jesper Ryberg

The principle of proportionality has gained widespread adherence in the modern retributively-dominated era of penal theory. It has often been held that, if one subscribes to a retributivist theory, then one is also committed to proportionality in punishment (or at least to proportionately-determined upper punishment constraints). In the present article, this assumption is challenged. It is shown that the inference from the fact that one offender has committed a more serious crime than another offender, to the conclusion that this offender should be punished more severely than the other, presupposes the satisfaction of two conditions: The Necessity Requirement and the Sufficiency Requirement. It is argued that modern expressionist accounts of retributivism fail to satisfy these requirements. Moreover, it is suggested that the satisfaction of these requirements constitutes a challenge for other retributivist theories. In so far as this is the case, the inference from retributivism to proportionality will be blocked.



中文翻译:

分配主义和比例的(缺乏)合理性

比例原则在刑罚理论的现代报应支配时代已得到广泛的遵守。通常认为,如果一个人赞成分配主义理论,那么一个人也将致力于惩罚的比例性(或者至少是按比例确定的上限惩罚约束)。在本文中,此假设受到质疑。结果表明,从一个罪犯比另一个罪犯犯下更严重的犯罪这一事实得出的结论是,该罪犯应比另一罪犯受到更严厉的惩罚,其前提是必须满足两个条件:必要性条件和充分性条件要求。有人认为,现代表现主义对分配主义的论述不能满足这些要求。而且,建议满足这些要求构成了其他分配主义理论的挑战。在这种情况下,从分配主义到比例性的推论将被阻止。

更新日期:2021-05-11
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