This paper argues that Kant endorses a distinction between rational and natural sympathy, and it presents an interpretation of rational sympathy as a power of voluntary a posteriori productive imagination. In rational sympathy we draw on the imagination’s voluntary powers (a) to subjectively unify the contents of intuition, in order to imaginatively put ourselves in others’ places, and (b) to associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to convey their feelings, in such a way that those contents prompt feelings in us that are like their feelings.

中文翻译：

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“理性的同情”及其在生产性想象中的基础

本文认为康德赞同区分理性同情和自然同情，并将理性同情解释为一种自愿的力量。后验的富有成效的想象力。在理性的同情中，我们利用想象的自愿力量（a）主观统一直觉的内容，以便想象性地将自己置于他人的位置，以及（b）将想象的直觉内容与他人用来表达他们感受的概念联系起来，以这样一种方式，这些内容在我们身上引发了与他们的感受相似的感受。