Future-biased individuals systematically prefer positively valenced events to be in the future (positive future-bias) and negatively valenced events to be in the past (negative future-bias). The most extreme form of future-bias is absolute future-bias, whereby we completely discount the value of past events when forming our preferences. Various authors have thought that we are absolutely future-biased and that future-bias (absolute or otherwise) is at least rationally permissible. The permissibility of future-bias is often held to be grounded in the structure of the temporal dimension. In this paper I consider several proposals for grounding the permissibility of such preferences and evaluate these in the light of the preferences we would have, and judge that we should have, in various time-travel scenarios. I argue that what we learn by considering these scenarios is that these preferences really have nothing to do with temporal structure. So, if something grounds their permissibility, it is not temporal structure.

中文翻译：

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时空旅行教我们什么关于未来的偏见

偏向未来的人系统地倾向于将正价事件发生在将来（正向未来偏差），将负价事件发生在过去（负的未来偏差）。未来偏见的最极端形式是绝对未来偏见，由此我们在形成自己的偏好时会完全不考虑过去事件的价值。许多作者都认为我们绝对是偏向未来的，并且偏见（绝对的或其他的）至少是合理允许的。未来偏见的可允许性通常被认为是基于时间维度的结构。在本文中，我考虑了一些基于此类偏好的可允许性的建议，并根据我们在各种时间旅行场景中将拥有的偏好进行评估，并判断我们应该拥有的偏好。我认为，我们通过考虑这些场景可以学到的是，这些偏好确实与时间结构无关。因此，如果某些东西基于其允许性，则它不是时间结构。