This paper develops spatial, game-theoretical models of European Union (EU) policy-making that include the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous such models have typically ignored the Presidency's role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission's proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency's preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whether the Presidency's role limits or expands the Commission's powers. We find that even though the Commission has lost powers as a result of the introduction and extension of the codecision procedure, as shown in the literature, it maintains a degree of legislative power by strategically using the rotating Presidency. In particular the Commission times its proposals. It formulates a proposal on an issue when the Presidency is close to itself on that issue.

本文开发了欧盟 (EU) 政策制定的空间博弈论模型，其中包括轮值的理事会主席作为主要参与者之一。以前的此类模式通常忽略了总统府的作用，尽管它有助于通过立法程序引导委员会的提案。我们研究委员会在制定提案时是否考虑了总统的偏好，以及总统的角色是否限制或扩大了委员会的权力。我们发现，尽管委员会由于引入和扩展共同决策程序而失去了权力，如文献所示，但它通过战略性地使用轮值主席来保持一定程度的立法权。特别是委员会对其提案进行计时。