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Driver Expectations toward Strategic Routing
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board ( IF 1.7 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-06 , DOI: 10.1177/03611981211006426
Alexander Kröller 1 , Falk Hüffner 1 , Łukasz Kosma 2 , Katja Kröller 3 , Mattia Zeni 4
Affiliation  

Strategic Routing is a traffic intervention mechanism. To reduce traffic in a certain area, drivers are asked to take a pre-defined route diverting them from the area, even though this increases their travel time. This can be implemented with navigation apps or in-dash navigation from navigation service providers such as TomTom or Google. Triggered by a traffic authority, the driver receives information through the service provider’s infrastructure and user interface about a new route and potentially a reward. In this work, we investigate the dynamics between traffic authority, service provider, and end user by analyzing user expectations. Ultimately, service providers are competing for customers. They can, therefore, only implement strategic routing if it appeals to drivers rather than scares them away. We report on the insights of a two-stage study with 457 participants, exploring what kind of strategic routing interventions are appreciated by drivers. We find that drivers report a high interest in seeing diversion suggestions, even when they are not inclined to take them. However, they are unwilling to have their route adapted automatically. Important factors affecting drivers’ willingness to divert are the reason for the detour and the additional driving time. Incentives do increase the efficacy, but only marginally increase user appreciation, indicating that users may mistrust strategic routing that relies too strongly on incentives.



中文翻译:

推动者对战略路线的期望

战略路由是一种交通干预机制。为了减少某个区域的交通,要求驾驶员采取预定的路线将他们从该区域改道,即使这会增加他们的出行时间。这可以通过导航应用或来自TomTom或Google的导航服务提供商的仪表板导航来实现。驾驶员由交通部门触发,通过服务提供商的基础设施和用户界面接收有关新路线和潜在奖励的信息。在这项工作中,我们通过分析用户期望来调查流量管理机构,服务提供商和最终用户之间的动态。最终,服务提供商正在争夺客户。因此,他们只有在吸引司机而不是吓跑他们的情况下,才能实施战略路线。我们报告了一项由457名参与者组成的为期两阶段的研究的真知灼见,探讨了驾驶员喜欢哪种战略性路线干预。我们发现,即使他们不愿意接受驾驶建议,他们也非常希望看到转移建议。但是,他们不愿意自动调整其路线。影响驾驶员转向的意愿的重要因素是绕道的原因和额外的驾驶时间。激励的确提高了效力,但仅在一定程度上提高了用户的欣赏度,这表明用户可能不信任过于依赖激励的战略路线。即使他们不愿意接受它们。但是,他们不愿意自动调整其路线。影响驾驶员转向的意愿的重要因素是绕道的原因和额外的驾驶时间。激励的确提高了效力,但仅在一定程度上提高了用户的欣赏度,这表明用户可能不信任过于依赖激励的战略路线。即使他们不愿意接受它们。但是,他们不愿意自动调整其路线。影响驾驶员转向的意愿的重要因素是绕道的原因和额外的驾驶时间。激励的确提高了效力,但仅在一定程度上提高了用户的欣赏度,这表明用户可能不信任过于依赖激励的战略路线。

更新日期:2021-05-08
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