Research suggests that earnings-disclosure-related litigation causes managers to reduce subsequent disclosure, perhaps stemming from a belief that even their good faith disclosures will cause them trouble. This paper considers unexplored dimensions of disclosure and alternative channels of disclosure to provide additional evidence that speaks to how litigation shapes managers’ disclosure strategies. Consistent with Skinner (1994)’s classic legal liability hypothesis, we find that, while managers reduce and delay forecasts of positive earnings news following litigation, they increase the frequency and timeliness of their bad news forecasts. Moreover, many managers who were nonguiders prior to facing legal scrutiny begin guiding following litigation. Managers also maintain (if not increase) the information they provide via press releases and during conference calls following litigation. Supporting the notion that managers use disclosure to walk down expectations, additional analyses document an increase in the likelihood that lawsuit firms report earnings that beat consensus forecasts in the post-lawsuit period. Collectively, our evidence suggests that following litigation managers continue to view disclosure as a valuable tool that shapes their firms’ information environments and reduces expected legal costs. In so doing, it supports an important alternative viewpoint of how firms respond to litigation as well as the effectiveness of litigation as a disciplining mechanism.

研究表明，与收益披露相关的诉讼会导致经理减少以后的披露，这可能是基于这样的信念，即即使是诚实的披露也会给他们带来麻烦。本文考虑了未探索的披露范围和替代披露渠道，以提供更多证据证明诉讼如何影响经理的披露策略。与Skinner（1994）的经典法律责任假设相一致，我们发现，尽管管理人员减少和延迟了诉讼后对正收益消息的预测，但他们增加了不良消息预测的频率和及时性。此外，许多在接受法律审查之前是非指导者的管理人员在诉讼之后开始提供指导。管理人员还维护（如果不增加）他们通过新闻稿以及诉讼后的电话会议提供的信息。支持经理使用信息披露来降低期望的观点，另外的分析表明，诉讼公司报告的收入在诉讼后期间超过了共识预测的可能性有所增加。总体而言，我们的证据表明，后续的诉讼管理者继续将披露视为塑造公司信息环境并降低预期法律成本的宝贵工具。这样，它支持了一个重要的替代观点，即企业如何应对诉讼以及诉讼作为一种纪律机制的有效性。进一步的分析表明，诉讼公司报告的收入在诉讼后期间超过了市场预期的可能性有所增加。总体而言，我们的证据表明，后续的诉讼管理者继续将披露视为塑造公司信息环境并降低预期法律成本的宝贵工具。这样，它支持了一个重要的替代观点，即企业如何应对诉讼以及诉讼作为一种纪律机制的有效性。进一步的分析表明，诉讼公司报告的收入在诉讼后期间超过了市场预期的可能性有所增加。总体而言，我们的证据表明，后续的诉讼管理者继续将披露视为塑造公司信息环境并降低预期法律成本的宝贵工具。这样，它支持了一个重要的替代观点，即企业如何应对诉讼以及诉讼作为一种纪律机制的有效性。我们的证据表明，后续的诉讼管理人继续将披露视为塑造公司信息环境并降低预期法律成本的宝贵工具。这样，它支持了一个重要的替代观点，即企业如何应对诉讼以及诉讼作为一种纪律机制的有效性。我们的证据表明，后续的诉讼管理人继续将披露视为塑造公司信息环境并降低预期法律成本的宝贵工具。这样，它支持了一个重要的替代观点，即企业如何应对诉讼以及诉讼作为一种纪律机制的有效性。