ABSTRACT

Unlike the dominant theories based on the rigid assumption that “technology standards must contain only essential patents”, this paper discusses the standard alliances that are engaged in their cumulative innovation. Its focus is particularly on a more realistic setting that a standard alliance should contain both the essential and the non-essential patents. We use the essential-patent’s ratio, which denotes the percentage of the essential patents in the total patents in a standard, as the cumulative innovation model’s core variable. The mathematical analysis illustrates that the essential-patent’s ratio performs an important role in the arguments’ standards. There is an optimal portfolio that maximizes the alliances’ efficiency in an innovation competition. It implies that the social welfare effects depend on the dynamic trade-off between the long-term technical gap caused by the technological upgrades’ missing opportunities and the short-term welfare losses that consumers may suffer. The patents’ and antitrust laws should tolerate a certain number of non-essential patents being contained by the technology standards.

摘要

与基于“技术标准必须仅包含必要专利”的僵化假设的主流理论不同，本文讨论了从事累积创新的标准联盟。它的重点尤其是一个更现实的环境，即标准联盟应包含必要专利和非必要专利。我们使用必要专利比，即必要专利占标准专利总数的百分比，作为累积创新模型的核心变量。数学分析表明，必要专利比率在论证标准中发挥着重要作用。有一个最优的投资组合可以最大限度地提高联盟在创新竞争中的效率。这意味着社会福利效应取决于技术升级错失机会造成的长期技术差距与消费者可能遭受的短期福利损失之间的动态权衡。专利法和反垄断法应允许技术标准包含一定数量的非必要专利。