ABSTRACT

One of Mark Textor’s main aims in Brentano’s Mind is to refute Brentano’s claim that intentionality – the capacity our mental acts have for being of, about, or directed on something – is the mark of the mental. I defend the view that Brentano analysed intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence (and so wasn’t an intentionality primitivist as Textor suggests). And I argue that we can regard intentionality as being the mark of the mental, but only if we give a non-relational analysis of the idea of intentional inexistence. Textor objects to an analysis of intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence for failing to account for the relationship between the object our mental act is directed on, and the ‘immanent’ or ‘inexistent’ object which all mental acts contain. I claim that this problem doesn’t arise if the object our mental act is directed on just is the immanent/ inexistent object. I argue that Brentano (at least sometimes) seems to identify the two. I then offer my own view of intentionality according to which our mental acts are directed on immanent/ inexistent objects, and that ‘directedness’ should be understood non-relationally.

摘要

马克·特克斯特在布伦塔诺的《心灵》中的主要目标之一是反驳布伦塔诺的主张，即意向性——我们的心理行为具有“属于” 、 “关于”或“指向”的能力某物——是精神的标记。我捍卫这样的观点，即布伦塔诺从意向不存在的角度分析了意向性（因此他不像德克斯特所暗示的那样是意向性原始主义者）。我认为，我们可以将意向性视为精神的标志，但前提是我们对意向不存在的想法进行非关系分析。特克斯托反对用意向不存在来分析意向性，因为他未能解释我们的心理行为所针对的对象与所有心理行为所包含的“内在”或“不存在”对象之间的关系。我认为，如果我们的心理行为所针对的对象只是内在/不存在的物体。我认为布伦塔诺（至少有时）似乎认同这两者。然后，我提出我自己的意向性观点，根据该观点，我们的心理行为是针对内在/不存在的对象的，并且“定向性”应该被理解为非关系性的。