We examine whether sectional interest groups influence monetary policy goals in a manner consistent with their interests as distributive coalitions. In particular, we explore whether bank groups and labor groups are associated with the incidence of inflation targeting by the central bank. Controlling for a variety of economic and institutional factors, our main findings reveal that bank groups are associated with a higher probability that a country is an inflation-targeter while labor groups are associated with a lower probability. The findings are conditional on the level of democracy and on aspects of central bank independence.

中文翻译：

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瞄准通胀目标：利益集团的影响

我们研究部门利益集团是否以与其作为分配联盟的利益相一致的方式影响货币政策目标。特别是，我们探讨了银行集团和劳工集团是否与中央银行针对通胀目标的发生率相关。通过对各种经济和制度因素的控制，我们的主要发现表明，银行集团与一个国家成为通货膨胀目标的可能性较高，而劳动力集团与一个较低的可能性有关。这些发现取决于民主程度和中央银行独立性。