We investigate the strategy-proof provision and financing of indivisible club good facilities when individuals are subject to congestion costs that are non-decreasing in the number of other club members and in a private type parameter. An allocation rule specifies how the individuals are to be partitioned into clubs and how the costs of the facilities are to be shared by club members as a function of the types. We show that some combinations of our axioms are incompatible when congestion costs are continuous and strictly increasing in the type parameter, but that all of them are compatible if congestion costs are dichotomous and there is equal cost sharing. We present a number of examples of allocation rules with equal cost sharing and determine which of our axioms they satisfy when the congestion cost is linear in the type parameter. We also show that using iterative voting on ascending size to determine a club partition is not, in general, strategy-proof when each facility’s cost is shared equally.

当个人承受的交通拥堵成本在其他俱乐部会员的数量和私人类型参数不变的情况下，我们研究不可分割的俱乐部良好设施的策略提供和融资。分配规则指定了如何将个人分为俱乐部，以及俱乐部成员如何根据类型来分摊设施的费用。我们表明，当拥塞成本持续增长并且类型参数严格增加时，我们公理的某些组合是不兼容的，但是如果拥塞成本是二分法并且成本分担相等，则所有公理的组合都是兼容的。我们给出了具有相等成本分担的分配规则的许多示例，并确定当拥塞成本在类型参数中呈线性时，它们满足我们的哪些公理。