The administrative state continues to incite ardent academic and judicial opinion. A long-standing debate centres around the executive powers enjoyed and exercised by unelected government bureaucracies, most commonly exemplified by the executive, legislative, and judicial competences of administrative agencies. The structure of government in the modern administrative state extends far beyond a simple conception of three separate branches of government: executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is the apparent violations of the intended roles and competences of each branch that fuel concerns about the administrative state, especially in the United States (US). While the role of ‘big government’ and the nature of modern governing practices is a global concern, debate about the (in)congruence between the administrative state and the US Constitution is particularly mature and entrenched.

Law and Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State responds to critics of the administrative state who claim that it is variously unconstitutional, unaccountable, and illegitimate. The book frames the contemporary US debate about administrative law as one of staunch disagreement between its critics and supporters. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule identify a shared concern among critics about the illegitimacy of the modern administrative state and its effect on the separation of powers, democracy, and the rule of law. These critics find particularly problematic the capacity of federal administrative agencies to exercise powers that are reserved for the executive, legislature, and judiciary in the Constitution. On the contrary, supporters defend the administrative state's political and legal legitimacy, seeing it as ‘essential for promoting the common good in contemporary society’ (p. 3). They regard agencies as performing important functions to protect against various forms of exploitation and harm in areas such as health, labour, economy, and the environment.

Chapter 1 examines and confronts the legal claims and constitutional theory presented by critics of the administrative state. The authors offer an impressive summary of the literature from a range of originalist and libertarian legal scholars11 See for example G. Lawson, ‘The Rise of the Administrative State’ (1994) 107 Harvard Law Rev. 1231; P. Hamburger, ‘Chevron Bias’ (2016) 84 George Washington Law Rev. 1187; R. A. Epstein, How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (2006). and the tendencies among judges to support associated reinterpretations of administrative law. The reader is provided with an overview of criticisms that the administrative state betrays constitutional commitments to political accountability and private liberty, and fails to exercise sufficient checks on executive power. In response, Sunstein and Vermeule offer a ‘more sober view of American public law’ (p. 22) by returning to the texts and motivating concerns behind the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which stipulates the competences and procedures that govern federal administrative agencies’ regulatory functions, and the Constitution. While the authors do not provide a ‘full reconstruction’ of the original meaning of the Constitution (p. 22), their aim is to highlight the insecure historical and doctrinal foundations of the originalist and libertarian critiques of the administrative state.

This sober response presents two related arguments. First, in spite of claims about returning to the original text, Sunstein and Vermeule understand the motivations of critics to be grounded in contemporary as opposed to historical fears – primarily, fears about administrative agencies exercising discretionary powers and the absence of adequate political accountability. Second, originalist claims about the Constitution's commitment to limiting the exercise of executive power present a partial reading of the original text and its aims. Returning to the writings of Madison and Hamilton, the authors set out the founding fathers’ various motivations, including the need for strong national government and concerns about abuses of power by the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. These competing concerns indicate the ‘full universe of risks’ that must be balanced in the Constitution and recognized by public lawyers (p. 30). Therefore, the APA and the Constitution should be read as the attempt to accommodate a strong executive complete with delegated powers for administrative agencies with concerns about private liberty, democracy, and accountability. As Sunstein and Vermeule put it, ‘the Constitution and the administrative state attempt to channel and constrain, rather than eliminate or minimize, executive discretion’ (p. 24).

While the authors present a nuanced conception of public law, they concede that there is ample scope for administrative law reform and accept that their arguments are unlikely to appease staunch critics of the administrative state. In order to break this deadlock, Chapter 2 sets out a framework that aims to achieve a compromise and ‘common language’ for evaluating the legality of administrative law (p. 6). This ‘second best approach’ (p. 10) does not propose the ideal scenario for either the supporter or the critic of the administrative state but instead a mechanism for allaying fears about the rule of law while allowing sufficient delegation of powers to ensure that agencies are capable of performing their intended functions.

Sunstein and Vermeule's framework of procedural principles is drawn from Lon Fuller's internal morality of law. For Fuller, law's internal morality provides a set of procedures for the creation and maintenance of law. Fuller sets out eight principles that rules must be: general, publicly available, prospective, sufficiently clear, non-contradictory, possible to fulfil, relatively constant through time, and congruent with official action.22 L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1969) 39. The principles of internal morality constitute the requirements and aspirations of the rule of law. Accordingly, the authors repurpose these principles as a framework capable of adjudicating conflicts about ‘the scope, aims, and powers of the administrative state’ (p. 10).

A key move here is to identify a concern for legality and the principles of the rule of law as a common denominator among criticisms of the administrative state. Drawing on a ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law, the authors detail the ways in which grants of discretionary power and other key pillars of administrative law are subject to rules about rule making and rigorous judicial scrutiny directed at protecting fundamental constitutional values.

With the evaluative framework established, each remaining chapter analyses the congruence between the principles of internal morality and current administrative law. Chapter 3 highlights judicial concerns for the principles of consistency and reliance. Chapter 4 identifies the limitations of internal morality for comprehending administrative law and holding it to account. This method involves detailed analysis of majority and dissenting judgments in key administrative law cases. These include Auer deference (to agency interpretations of their own rules),33 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Chevron deference (to agency interpretation of statutes),44 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). and the non-delegation doctrine concerning the transfer and exercise of legislative power. In addition, the authors draw on an extensive range of case law and judicial opinion to demonstrate the intrinsic role of these principles at different judicial levels. This method provides the foundation for the bold but evidence-based claim that the administrative state has developed in accordance with principles of the rule of law. Moreover, taking the rule of law as a common desirable standard, the authors contend that the internal morality of administrative law can defuse high-intensity conflicts and concerns about ‘arbitrary commands’ or grants of ‘unstructured discretion’ to agencies (p. 43).

In spite of its support for the guiding effect of internal morality on legal officials, Law and Leviathan is not an uncritical celebration or defence of the administrative state. For instance, in Chapter 4, the authors acknowledge three explicit limitations of their framework. First, the appeal to the internal morality of law can mean the absence of sufficient grounding for decisions in sources of positive law. This raises particular challenges in administrative law due to the Vermont Yankee decision to limit the scope of procedural requirements to those found in the APA.55 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). However, the authors insist on a more expansive role for Fullerian principles, identifying them as a fundamental part of law and key in ‘reasoned administrative lawmaking’ (p. 97). Second, there may be ‘trade-offs’ between the principles of legality and the provision of the common good (p. 97). Following Fuller, a violation of the principles of internal morality may be justified in delivering certain ends. The aspirational nature of internal morality means that its principles do not impose concrete duties. In practice, the judiciary will have to decide whether government has managed to balance sufficient respect for internal morality with the achievement of policy goals. Third, judges may lack the required expertise and time to adequately review agency decision making, opening up the possibility for judicial errors and insufficient checks on agencies that expediate policies at the expense of law's internal morality.

Chapter 5 turns to the Roberts Court and identifies its reliance upon the principles of internal morality in its treatment of administrative law. The authors set out why the Court has rejected the more radical proposals of originalists and libertarians, instead favouring an approach that implements ‘Fullerian principles as a set of safeguards for the values underlying the rule of law’ (p. 118). Drawing on Sunstein's early work,66 C. R. Sunstein, ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’ (1985) 38 Stanford Law Rev. 29. the authors argue that the Court has taken a ‘surrogate safeguards’ approach to administrative law whereby ‘agencies enjoy expansive authority, but … that authority is shaped and constrained by the morality of administrative law’ (p. 138). This approach has, according to the authors, enabled the Court to avoid the complexity of substantive policy making while protecting against procedural improprieties and upholding the rule of law.

The central project of Law and Leviathan remains true to Fuller's conception of the eight principles of legality as underpinning law's intrinsic commitment to achieving moral ends. The central purpose of law, for Fuller, is the ‘enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’.77 Fuller, op. cit., n. 2, p. 106. Importantly, law is something more than a set of mere commands or projection of authority. Drawing on the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel, Fuller understood government as having a moral obligation to realize conditions of reciprocity between government and citizens. Reciprocity is key to internal morality because it envisions a bargain between citizen and government, whereby subjecting human conduct to the rule of law both protects against abuses of power and enables the conditions of rational social coordination. While the authors do not draw explicitly on Fuller's understanding of reciprocity, it is implicit in their thesis that the internal morality of administrative law ‘channels and constrains’ the exercise of executive discretion. This thesis rejects readings of administrative law as facilitating abuses of executive power and insists that legal officials have, for the most part, sought to provide a framework for organizing the competing risks and rewards of administrative agencies in the coordination of contemporary society. The value of Sunstein and Vermeule's analysis lies in the revival of Fuller's understanding of law's fundamental purpose and the role played by rule of law principles in the development of administrative law.

The authors hope that the book will reach an international audience who share similar concerns with the challenges of contemporary administrative law. While the case law and relevant legal issues are unpacked for the non-specialist, the scope and impact of the arguments are more likely to pack a punch (and provoke a response) among their primary audience: public lawyers in the US, both academic and practising. The authors’ analysis has international scope in its recommendation of applying a Fullerian analysis to evaluate the extent to which the regulation of administrative law is ‘channelled and constrained’ by principles of the rule of law.

Following Sunstein and Vermeule, rule of law principles provide an essential framework for adjudicating and managing competences in the administrative state – a framework that reduces the complexities of modern law and evaluates its legality and legitimacy on procedural grounds. This achieves the authors’ aim of narrowing the frame for evaluating administrative law to issues of procedural propriety. In addition to inevitable criticisms from their primary interlocutors, the enduring challenge for this framework will be its capacity to sufficiently respond to impropriety and provide conditions that protect and enable the common good. While it is beyond the scope and aims of Law and Leviathan, the book's central thesis raises equally important issues about the extent to which a commitment to procedural propriety is capable of evaluating the administrative state's contribution to the common good. Whether this leads to well-worn debates about procedural and substantive approaches to the rule of law or critical analysis of the ideological commitments of modern government,88 See for example A. Supiot, Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance (2017). the administrative state will continue to pose fundamental challenges to democracy and the principles of ‘good’ government.

The authors make repeated reference to the capacity for administrative agencies to deliver the common good and general welfare. However, in the text, what these terms mean and what they require in practice are assumed. Given the influence of Fullerian reasoning about the common good as provided by and limited to law's fundamental purpose of facilitating social coordination, this assumption is easily explained. However, it also signals a key weakness of the framework's capacity to redeem the administrative state from broader criticism – for example, questions about the common good and shared interest that insist upon more forthright commitments to the substantive nature of constitutional values.

The generality, clarity, and non-retroactivity of law may provide the foundation for a just legal system but we might aspire beyond Fuller for something like dignity and solidarity. For instance, agencies whose policies fail to adequately respond to the demands of workers or provide sufficient social security may satisfy the principles of legality but pose a substantive threat to the common good. The authors do not confront this challenge; they are engaged in the task of ‘redeeming’ the administrative state from critics who demand limited government. As such, there is less concern for critics who accept the role of complex administrative government but call into question the turn to governance, the rise of market logics, the absence of democratic mechanisms, and the capacity for judicial commitment to ‘due process’ to play any meaningful role in defending fundamental values. In this sense, the exercise of redeeming the administrative state is contingent on both which pathologies we are willing to vindicate and which values we insist on recovering and protecting.

行政国继续煽动学术和司法意见。长期的辩论围绕未选举产生的政府官僚机构享有和行使的行政权力，最常见的例子是行政机构的行政，立法和司法权限。在现代行政国家中，政府的结构远远超出了三个独立的政府部门的简单概念：行政，立法和司法。明显地违反了每个分支机构的预期角色和能力的做法，加剧了人们对行政州的担忧，尤其是在美国。尽管“大政府”的作用和现代治理实践的性质已成为全球关注的问题，

法律与利维坦：赎回行政国回应了对行政国家的批评，他们声称行政国家在各种程度上违宪，不负责任和不合法。该书将当代美国关于行政法的辩论归结为批评家和支持者之间的强烈分歧之一。卡斯·桑斯坦（Cass Sunstein）和阿德里安·维米尔（Adrian Vermeule）指出，批评家们对现代行政国家的非法性及其对分权，民主和法治的影响产生了共同的关注。这些批评家发现，联邦行政机构行使宪法中行政，立法和司法机构保留的权力的能力特别成问题。相反，支持者捍卫行政国家的政治和法律合法性，将其视为“促进当代社会共同利益的必要条件”（第3页）。

第1章研究并面对行政国家批评者提出的法律主张和宪法理论。作者提供了一系列原始论者和自由主义者的法律学者令人印象深刻的文献综述11例如，见G. Lawson的“行政国家的崛起”（1994年），第107版《哈佛法》。1231; P.Hamburger，《 Chevron Bias》（2016年）84乔治华盛顿法律评论。1187; 爱泼斯坦（RA Epstein），《进步主义者如何改写宪法》（2006年）。以及法官支持行政法相关解释的趋势。向读者提供了有关批评的概述，这些批评是行政国背叛了宪法对政治责任和私人自由的承诺，并且没有对行政权力进行充分的检查。作为回应，Sunstein和Vermeule通过回到案文并激发《行政程序法》（APA）背后的关注，提出了“对美国公法的更清醒的看法”（第22页），该法规定了管辖联邦行政机构的权限和程序。的监管职能和宪法。尽管作者没有对《宪法》的原始含义进行“全面重建”（第22页），

这种清醒的回应提出了两个相关的论点。首先，尽管声称要返回原始文本，但Sunstein和Vermeule理解批评家的动机是基于当代的，而不是历史上的恐惧-主要是对行政机构行使自由裁量权的恐惧以及缺乏适当的政治责任感。第二，原始论者对宪法承诺限制行使行政权力的主张提出了对原始文本及其目的的部分解读。回到麦迪逊和汉密尔顿的著作中，作者阐述了开国元勋们的各种动机，包括需要强大的国家政府以及对立法，司法和政治权力滥用的担忧。行政部门。这些相互竞争的担忧表明，“全部风险”必须在宪法中加以权衡并得到公共律师的认可（第30页）。因此，应将APA和《宪法》理解为试图容纳一个强大的行政机构，该行政机构具有对私人自由，民主和问责制的担忧的行政机构的授权权力。正如Sunstein和Vermeule所言，“宪法和行政国家试图引导和约束行政自由裁量权，而不是消除或减少其行政自由裁量权”（第24页）。

尽管作者提出了微妙的公法概念，但他们承认行政法改革有足够的空间，并接受他们的论点不太可能使对行政国家的坚定批评者安抚。为了打破这种僵局，第2章提出了一个框架，旨在实现一种折衷和“通用语言”来评估行政法的合法性（第6页）。这种“第二好的方法”（第10页）并没有为行政国家的支持者或批评者提出理想的方案，而是一种缓解对法治的恐惧的机制，同时允许足够的权力下放以确保代理机构能够执行其预期的功能。

Sunstein和Vermeule的程序原则框架源于Lon Fuller的内部法律道德。对于富勒来说，法律的内部道德为创造和维护法律提供了一套程序。富勒提出了规则必须遵循的八项原则：一般性，可公开获得，预期性，足够清晰，无矛盾性，可能实现，在时间上相对恒定以及与官方行动相一致2。2 L. Fuller，《法律道德》（1969）39。内部道德原则构成了法治的要求和追求。因此，作者将这些原则重新设定为能够裁定“行政国的范围，目标和权力”之间冲突的框架（第10页）。

这里的关键举措是，在对行政国家的批评中，将对合法性和法治原则的关注确定为共同点。作者以“薄”的法治概念为基础，详细描述了授予自由裁量权和行政法其他关键支柱的方式如何受制于规则制定和针对保护基本宪法价值的严格司法审查的规则。

建立评估框架后，其余各章将分析内部道德原则与现行行政法之间的一致性。第三章重点介绍了司法人员对连贯性和信赖性原则的关注。第四章指出了内部道德对于理解行政法和追究法律责任的局限性。该方法涉及对主要行政法律案件中多数的不同意见和不同的判决进行详细分析。这些包括Auer的尊重（对代理机构对其自身规则的解释），33 Auer诉Robbins案，519 US 452（1997）。 人字形的尊重（对机构的法规解释），44雪佛龙美国公司。诉自然资源保护委员会的公司，467 US 837（1984）。以及关于立法权的转移和行使的非授权理论。此外，作者借鉴了广泛的判例法和司法观点，以证明这些原则在不同司法水平上的内在作用。这种方法为行政国根据法治原则发展的大胆但基于证据的主张提供了基础。此外，作者认为，以法治为共同的标准是，行政法的内部道德可以化解高强度的冲突和对“任意命令”或对机构的“非结构性裁量权”的担忧（第43页）。 。

尽管法律和利维坦支持内部道德对法律官员的指导作用，但它并不是对行政国家的不加批判的庆祝或辩护。例如，在第4章中，作者承认了其框架的三个明显限制。首先，诉诸法律的内部道德可能意味着没有足够的根据来制定积极法律的依据。由于佛蒙特州扬基大学决定将程序要求的范围限制在APA中规定的范围，这给行政法带来了特殊挑战。55佛蒙特州洋基核电公司。诉自然资源保护委员会公司（Natural Resources Defence Council Inc.），第435卷，第519页（1978）。然而，作者坚持要求富勒原则具有更广泛的作用，将其确定为法律的基本组成部分，并是“合理的行政立法”的关键（第97页）。第二，合法性原则与提供公共物品之间可能存在“取舍”（第97页）。在富勒（Fuller）之后，违反内部道德原则可能会达到某些目的。内部道德的理想性质意味着其内部原则并未施加具体义务。在实践中，司法部门将必须决定政府是否设法在对内部道德的充分尊重与实现政策目标之间取得平衡。第三，法官可能缺乏必要的专业知识和时间来充分审查代理机构的决策，

第五章转向罗伯茨法院，并指出其在行政法处理中对内部道德原则的依赖。作者提出了为什么法院拒绝原始主义者和自由主义者的更激进的提议，而是赞成一种采用“以富勒原则作为法治基础价值保障的方法”的方法（第118页）。借鉴了Sunstein的早期作品，66 CR Sunstein，“美国公法中的利益集团”（1985年），38 Stanford LawRev。29。作者认为，法院对行政法采取了“替代性保障”方法，即“机构享有广泛的权力，但是……权力是由行政法的道德塑造和约束的”（第138页）。作者认为，这种方法使法院能够避免实质性政策制定的复杂性，同时防止程序不当和维护法治。

法律和利维坦（Leviathan）的中心项目仍然符合富勒（Fuller）对合法性八项原则的构想，它是法律对实现道德目标的内在承诺的基础。对于富勒来说，法律的主要目的是“使人的行为服从规则治理的企业”。77富勒，同上。cit。，n。2，第 106。重要的是，法律不仅仅是一套纯粹的命令或权威的投射。富勒利用社会学家乔治·西梅尔（Georg Simmel）的工作，将政府理解为道义上的义务，以实现政府与公民之间的互惠条件。互惠是内部道德的关键，因为它预见了公民与政府之间的讨价还价，从而使人的行为符合法治既可以防止滥用权力，又可以实现合理的社会协调条件。尽管作者没有明确借鉴富勒对互惠的理解，但在他们的论文中却隐含着行政法的内部道德“引导和限制”行政自由裁量权的行使。本文反对将行政法视为滥用行政权力的观点，并坚持认为，法律官员在很大程度上寻求提供一种框架，以组织行政机构在当代社会的协调中相互竞争的风险和报酬。Sunstein和Vermeule的分析的价值在于复兴了Fuller对法律的基本目的的理解以及法治原则在行政法发展中的作用。

作者希望这本书能吸引国际读者，他们对当代行政法的挑战也有类似的关注。虽然判例法和相关法律问题是针对非专家的，但争论的范围和影响更可能在主要受众中引起冲击（并引起回应）：美国的公共律师，包括学术界和法律界。练习。作者的分析在其建议中应用富勒氏分析来评估法治原则对行政法的规制“引导和约束”的程度具有国际范围。

遵循Sunstein和Vermeule之后，法治原则提供了一个用于裁定和管理行政国家权限的基本框架，该框架降低了现代法律的复杂性，并基于程序基础评估了其合法性和合法性。这实现了作者的目标，即将评估行政法的范围缩小到程序适当性问题。除了主要对话者的不可避免的批评外，该框架所面临的持久挑战将是其充分应对不当行为并提供保护和实现共同利益的条件的能力。虽然这超出了法律和Leviathan的范围和目标，该书的中心论点提出了同样重要的问题，即对程序适当性的承诺能够在多大程度上评估行政国家对共同利益的贡献。这是否引发了关于法治的程序性和实质性方法的争论不休，还是导致对现代政府的意识形态承诺进行批判性分析，88例如，见A. Supiot，《数字治理：制定效忠法律模型》（2017年）。 行政国家将继续对民主和“善”政府的原则构成根本性挑战。

作者反复提及行政机构提供公共物品和普通物品的能力。但是，在本文中，假设了这些术语的含义以及它们在实践中的要求。鉴于富勒主义对共同利益的推理的影响是法律所规定的促进社会协调的基本目的，并且仅限于此，法律的宗旨是促进社会协调，因此很容易解释这一假设。但是，这也标志着该框架从更广泛的批评中挽救行政国家的能力的一个关键弱点–例如，关于共同利益和共同利益的问题，这些问题要求对宪法价值的实质性做出更直接的承诺。

法律的普遍性，明确性和不可追溯性可能为公正的法律体系提供基础，但我们可能会追求超越富勒的尊严和团结。例如，其政策未能充分响应工人的要求或提供足够的社会保障的机构可能满足合法性原则，但对共同利益构成实质性威胁。作者没有面对这个挑战。他们从事要求要求有限政府的批评家“救赎”行政国家的任务。因此，对于那些接受复杂的行政政府作用但对转向治理，市场逻辑兴起，缺乏民主机制，司法部门对“正当程序”的承诺能够在捍卫基本价值观方面发挥任何有意义的作用。从这个意义上说，赎回行政国的行为取决于我们愿意证明哪些病态以及我们坚持要恢复和保护的价值观。