ABSTRACT

In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the aim of belief – both the teleological and normative interpretations – have the resources to explain certain descriptive and normative features of suspended belief, or suspension. I argue that despite the recent efforts of theorists to extend these theories to account for suspension, they ultimately fail. The implication is that we must either develop alternative theories of belief that can account for suspension, or we must abandon the assumption that these theories ought to be able to account for suspension. To close, I briefly consider some of the reasons we have in favor of pursuing each of these options, and I suggest that it is worth exploring the possibility that suspension is best understood as its own attitude, independently of theories of belief’s aim.

摘要

在本文中，我将讨论信念目标的不同解释（目的论和规范解释）是否具有资源来解释中止信念或中止的某些描述性和规范性特征。我认为，尽管理论家最近做出了努力，将这些理论扩展到悬架问题上，但它们最终还是失败了。言外之意是，我们要么必须开发出可以解释停顿的替代性信念理论，要么必须放弃这些理论应该能够解释停顿的假设。最后，我简要地考虑了我们赞成采用上述每个选项的一些原因，并且我建议值得探讨的是，最好将悬浮最好地理解为它自己的态度，而与信念目标的理论无关。