Abstract

Does international politics influence domestic politics? In the investment treaty regime, there is currently a debate about whether investor-state dispute settlement cases influence respondent state domestic regulation. We present a systematic test of this relationship. Using two unique datasets, we examine whether investor-state cases targeting environmental measures influence respondent states’ environmental regulation. We make two theoretical contributions. First, we present an integrated typology of potential regulatory responses to investor-state dispute settlement cases. Second, we propose a novel, conditional theory of regulatory responses to investor-state cases. We argue that states’ responses should depend on their bureaucratic capacity. In our analysis, we find that respondent state bureaucratic capacity conditions the relationship between investor-state cases and subsequent domestic regulation. There is a more pronounced negative relationship between investor-state cases and regulatory behavior in states with high bureaucratic capacity than in low-capacity states.

中文翻译：

---

投资者与国家之间的争端解决案件是否会影响国内环境法规？被访者国家官僚能力的作用

摘要

国际政治会影响国内政治吗？在投资条约制度中，目前有一个关于投资者与国家间争端解决案件是否影响被诉国国内法规的辩论。我们对这种关系进行了系统的测试。我们使用两个独特的数据集，研究针对环境措施的投资国案例是否影响受访者的环境法规。我们做出两个理论上的贡献。首先，我们提出了对投资者与国家间争端解决案件的潜在监管回应的综合类型。其次，我们提出了一种新颖的，有条件的对投资者-国家案例的监管反应的理论。我们认为，国家的回应应取决于其官僚能力。在我们的分析中，我们发现被诉人的国家官僚能力限制了投资者-国家案例与随后的国内法规之间的关系。在官僚能力高的州，投资人与政府之间的案例与监管行为之间的负相关关系比能力低的州更为明显。