Two powerful arguments have famously dominated the realism debate in philosophy of science: The No Miracles Argument (NMA) and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). A standard response to the PMI is selective scientific realism (SSR), wherein only the working posits of a theory are considered worthy of doxastic commitment. Building on the recent debate over the NMA and the connections between the NMA and the PMI, I here consider a stronger inductive argument that poses a direct challenge for SSR: Because it is sometimes exactly the working posits which contradict each other, i.e., that which is directly responsible for empirical success, SSR cannot deliver a general explanation of scientific success.

在科学哲学的现实主义辩论中，有两个有力的论据广为人知：无奇迹论证（NMA）和悲观元归纳法（PMI）。对PMI的标准响应是选择性的科学现实主义（SSR），其中只有理论的实际工作才被认为值得承担承诺。基于最近有关NMA的辩论以及NMA与PMI之间的联系，我在这里考虑一个更强的归纳论点，这对SSR构成直接挑战：因为有时恰恰是工作地点彼此矛盾，即对成功的经验直接负责，SSR无法对科学的成功做出一般性的解释。