We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.

中文翻译：

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再分配的不利因素：民主红利的证据

我们实验性地研究了在强制重新分配与在投票中民主选择时对工作征税和重新分配税收收入的抑制作用。我们发现了“民主红利”，因为在投票中选择再分配时的抑制效果比强加时要小得多。当在投票中被接受时，重新分配似乎更合法，因此不那么令人沮丧。