Today's complex mineral supply chains make it difficult to hold private actors to account in case they breach regulations. Non-state actors increasingly make efforts to help regulate these mineral supply chains via due diligence programmes. The purpose of this study is to investigate how non-state mineral supply chain regulation functions on the ground, and whether and under what conditions non-state actors can hold private actors to account. Based on an in-depth case study of the ITSCI programme in Rwanda, we demonstrate that although non-state regulation of mineral supply chains has huge potential, the ITSCI programme faces several challenges. We find that there are four conditions to be met for non-state actors to hold private supply chain actors to account: 1) the programme should provide clear and timely information to all stakeholders; 2) high-quality and frequent monitoring should be ensured; 3) there should be a possibility of imposing credible sanctions; and 4) the governance of the programme should act in the public interest. On the basis of our research it is reasonable to conclude that the ITSCI programme meets the third condition on sanctions, but that it faces a number of challenges with respect to the first, second and fourth condition.

当今复杂的矿产供应链使得在违反法规的情况下很难追究私人参与者的责任。非国家行为者越来越多地努力通过尽职调查计划帮助规范这些矿产供应链。本研究的目的是调查非国家矿产供应链监管如何在实地发挥作用，以及非国家行为者是否以及在何种条件下可以追究私人行为者的责任。基于对卢旺达 ITSCI 计划的深入案例研究，我们证明，尽管对矿物供应链的非国家监管具有巨大潜力，但 ITSCI 计划面临着若干挑战。我们发现，非国家行为者追究私营供应链行为者的责任需要满足四个条件：1) 该计划应向所有利益相关者提供清晰及时的信息；2) 应保证高质量和频繁的监测；3) 应该有实施可信制裁的可能性；4) 项目的治理应符合公共利益。根据我们的研究，可以合理地得出结论，ITSCI 计划满足制裁的第三个条件，但它在第一个、第二个和第四个条件方面面临许多挑战。