In this theoretical article, we develop a unified framework that encapsulates: i) — a system of heterogeneous cities, ii) — heterogeneous workers, iii) — the presence of agglomeration economies and congestion forces, and iv) — heterogeneous city composition preferences. We provide a full analytical characterization of the decentralized and centralized economies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that social mixing can constitute a unique and stable equilibrium. We also disentangle the different economic factors that shape within- and across-city social/income dispersion. We also find that individuals’ preferences be overturned at an aggregate scale, which is consistent with Schelling paradoxical findings. We then offer a rationale for these counterintuitive results. Last, we demonstrate that the decentralized economy is not optimal but can be restored by local subsidies.

在这篇理论文章中，我们开发了一个统一的框架，其中包含：i）-异类城市系统，ii）-异类工人，iii）-集聚经济和拥挤力量的存在，以及iv）-异类城市组成偏好。我们对权力下放和集权经济进行了全面的分析。与传统观点相反，我们证明了社会融合可以构成一个独特而稳定的平衡。我们还消除了影响城市内和城市间社会/收入分散的不同经济因素。我们还发现，个人的偏好总体上被推翻了，这与谢林悖论的发现是一致的。然后，我们为这些违反直觉的结果提供了理由。最后的，