ABSTRACT

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill—such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill.

摘要

许多美德认识论者在技能模型上构想认识能力——例如射箭、打棒球或下棋。在本文中，我认为这是一个错误：认知能力和技能是至关重要且相关的不同类型的能力。我认为，这破坏了将认知规范性理解为仅是熟练行动所熟悉的那种规范性的特例的流行尝试。事实上，正如我进一步论证的那样，认知能力类似于美德而不是技能——这一主张基于美德和技能之间的一个重要但经常被忽视的区别。结果是美德认识论确实应该基于美德，而不是技能。