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The value of board commitment
Review of Accounting Studies ( IF 4.011 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-01 , DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09586-9
Tim Baldenius , Xiaojing Meng , Lin Qiu

Boards can learn about the environment of their firms through information gathering and communicating with the CEO. In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment, some boards have taken steps to shape the communication more proactively by committing to decision rules, such as spending limits, before eliciting a report from the CEO. All else equal, such commitment power on the part of the board improves its communication with the CEO. However, taking into consideration the endogeneity of board composition/bias, we show that the board’s commitment power may in fact impede such communication, in equilibrium, by prompting the shareholders to appoint a more antagonistic board. We identify other cases where, in equilibrium, the board’s commitment power does foster communication, but ultimately reduces shareholder value, because the improved information flow dampens the board’s effort incentives. We discuss applications of our model to board staggering.



中文翻译:

董事会承诺的价值

董事会可以通过信息收集和与首席执行官沟通来了解其公司的环境。在后萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(Sarbanes-Oxley)的环境中,一些董事会已采取措施,通过遵循诸如支出限制之类的决策规则,更主动地塑造沟通方式,然后才征询CEO的报告。在其他所有条件相同的情况下,董事会的这种承诺权改善了与首席执行官的沟通。但是,考虑到董事会组成/偏见的内生性,我们表明,董事会的承诺权实际上可能会通过促使股东任命更具敌意的董事会来平衡这种沟通。我们确定了其他情况,在这种情况下,董事会的承诺权确实可以促进沟通,但最终会降低股东价值,因为改善的信息流会削弱董事会的工作动力。我们讨论了将模型应用于板交错的应用。

更新日期:2021-05-02
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