Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information have recently been implemented in European Union (EU) countries. These international tax reforms increase tax compliance in the short term. In the long run, however, taxpayers will continue looking abroad to avoid taxation and, countries, looking for additional revenues, will provide opportunities. As a result, tax competition intensifies and the initial increase in compliance could reverse. To avoid international tax reforms being counteracted by tax competition, this paper suggests bilateral responsive regulation to maximize compliance. This implies that countries would use different tax policy instruments toward other countries, including tax and secrecy havens. Our agent-based simulation finds that a differentiated policy response could increase tax compliance by 6.54 percent, which translates into an annual increase of €105 billion in EU tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains. Corporate income tax revenues in France, Spain, and the UK alone would already account for €35 billion.

中文翻译：

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双边响应性监管和国际税收竞争：基于代理的模拟

最近在欧盟 (EU) 国家实施了逐国报告和自动信息交换。这些国际税收改革在短期内提高了税收合规性。然而，从长远来看，纳税人将继续在国外寻求避税，而寻求额外收入的国家将提供机会。结果，税收竞争加剧，最初的合规增加可能会逆转。为了避免国际税收改革被税收竞争所抵消，本文建议双边响应性监管以最大限度地提高合规性。这意味着各国将对其他国家使用不同的税收政策工具，包括避税天堂和保密天堂。我们基于代理的模拟发现，差异化的政策响应可以将税收合规性提高 6.54%，这意味着欧盟在收入、利润和资本收益方面的税收每年增加 1050 亿欧元。仅法国、西班牙和英国的企业所得税收入就已经达到 350 亿欧元。