What kinds of feasibility restrictions should be taken into account in practically relevant political philosophy? David Estlund argues that “ought” does not imply “can will,” and, hence, that we should be very cautious regarding the inclusion of motivational restrictions in political philosophy. As Nicholas Southwood and David Wiens point out, however, Estlund’s position clashes with the requirement that “ought” implies “feasible.” The present article argues that even though we must accept that “ought” implies “feasible,” this does not settle the question regarding the adequate set of feasibility restrictions to be included in applied normative thinking. Instead, we need to distinguish different kinds of normative theory that require different sets of feasibility restrictions. For this, the article provides a taxonomy of feasibility restrictions and a preliminary discussion of the adequate set of feasibility restrictions for different kinds of normative theory.

中文翻译：

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超越“应该意味着可行”

在实际相关的政治哲学中应该考虑什么样的可行性限制？David Estlund 认为“应该”并不意味着“可以意志”，因此，我们应该非常谨慎地将动机限制纳入政治哲学。然而，正如 Nicholas Southwood 和 David Wiens 指出的那样，Estlund 的立场与“应该”意味着“可行”的要求相冲突。本文认为，即使我们必须接受“应该”意味着“可行”，但这并没有解决关于在应用规范性思维中包含的一套适当的可行性限制的问题。相反，我们需要区分需要不同可行性限制集的不同类型的规范理论。为了这，